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Abstract
This paper approaches the definition and properties of dynamic convex risk measures
through the notion of a family of concave valuation operators satisfying certain simple
and credible axioms. Exploring these in the simplest context of a finite time set and
finite sample space, we find natural risk-transfer and time-consistency properties for a
firm seeking to spread its risk across a group of subsidiaries.
1 Introduction.
The growing literature of risk measurement considers mainly3 single-period risk mea-
surement, where one attempts to ‘measure’ at time zero the risk involved in undertaking
to receive some contingent claim X at time 1. In this literature, a set A of acceptable
contingent claims is frequently taken to be the primitive object (as in [2], for example).
Such a set gives rise naturally to a risk measure ρA via the definition
ρA(X) = inf{m |X +m ∈ A},
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which is simply the least amount of cash that would have to be added to the contingent
claim X to make it acceptable. A risk measure is naturally decreasing in its argument;
if added cash b makes contingent claim X acceptable, and if X ′ ≤ X, then certainly
b+X ′ should be acceptable. This property makes the statement of various results rather
clumsy and non-intuitive; in common with others (for example, [3], [6], [7], [29] ), we
shall instead speak of a valuation4, which is simply the negative of a risk measure. Thus
in terms of the acceptance set A, we define the valuation piA by
piA(X) ≡ −ρA(X) = sup{m |X −m ∈ A}.
Expressed in this language, Artzner et al. [2] define a coherent valuation to be one
which satisfies four axioms equivalent to
(CV1) concavity : pi(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ λpi(X) + (1− λ)pi(Y ) (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1);
(CV2) positive homogeneity : if λ ≥ 0, then pi(λX) = λpi(X);
(CV3) monotonicity : if X ≤ Y , then pi(X) ≤ pi(Y );
(CV4) translation invariance: if m ∈ R, then pi(Y +m) = pi(Y ) +m.
They go on to show that (under simplifying assumptions) any such valuation is repre-
sentable as5
pi(X) = inf
Q∈Q
EQ[X], (1)
where Q is some collection of probability measures6.
The positive-homogeneity condition (CV2) is arguably unnatural, and was removed
by Fo¨llmer & Schied [20] and by Frittelli & Gianin [22] who thereby introduced the notion
of a concave valuation. They show that a concave valuation admits a representation as
pi(X) = inf
Q∈Q
{
EQ[X]− α(Q)
}
(2)
where α is a concave ‘penalty’ function on Q. Clearly if α ≡ 0, then we recover the rep-
resentation of a coherent valuation, but the notion of a concave valuation is more general.
Of course, the usefulness of a single-period study should be judged by the extent to
which it helps us to understand risk measurement in a multi-period setting; this has
been well recognised for some time, and recently attempts have been made to achieve
that extension. The keywords ‘dynamic’ and ‘multi-period’ occur frequently, but de-
scribe very different notions. One of these is where the goal is to value at intermediate
times some contingent claim to be received at the terminal time T ; this is in some sense
an interpolation of valuations, which nevertheless must be done in a naturally consis-
tent way. Examples of this kind of study include Peng [33], Detlefsen & Scandolo [15],
4This terminology is not standard, but is compact and clear. A commonly-used term is ‘monetary utility
function’, which is descriptive if a little long-winded.
5 The properties (CV) appeared in an earlier paper of Gilboa & Schmeidler [26], in the context of Bayesian
decision theory. This study was not concerned with risk measurement.
6 Evidently, if pi has the form (1) then it satisfies the properties (CV1-4).
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Klo¨ppel & Schweizer [29], Cheridito & Kupper [8], Fo¨llmer & Penner [19]. Another
notion of a dynamic measurement of risk is to take some random cashflow, and ascribe
some value to it at time 0: the contributions of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, Heath and Ku
[3], Fo¨llmer and Schied [20, 21], Cvitanic` and Karatzas [10], Nakano [31], Cheridito,
Delbaen and Kupper [6], and Riedel [34] are of this type. The notion of ‘dynamic’ risk
measurement which we plan to study in this paper takes random cash balance processes
as the inputs, and returns random processes, the valuations as functions of time, as the
output. This seems to us to be the setting in which one would want to apply ideas of
risk measurement. Moreover, the dynamic fluctuation of the cash balance is clearly the
essence of cashflow problems, and therefore of risk measurement; it is not sufficient to
consider only the total amount of cash accumulated by some arbitrary time in the fu-
ture, as the experience of Long Term Capital Management demonstrates. This (fullest)
notion of dynamic risk measurement is as yet little studied: Scandolo [37],[38], Frittelli
& Scandolo [25], and Cheridito, Delbaen & Kupper [7] are contributions of this type.
The major difference between the static and multi-period frameworks is the issue
of dynamic consistency. Although every set of probability measures generates a coher-
ent valuation in the static framework, only sets of probability measures consistent in an
appropriate sense yield dynamic coherent valuations. This consistency property of prob-
ability measures (or stability by “pasting”) has been analysed by Epstein and Schneider
[17] (building upon the atemporal multiple-priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [26]
and using prior-by-prior Bayesian updating for “rectangular” sets of priors), Artzner et
al. [3] (using change-of-measure martingales) and Riedel [34] (via Bayesian updating and
a different kind of translation invariance property). It is often referred to as multiplica-
tive stability [13]. The axiomatic approach of this paper has also been independently
proposed by Cheridito, Delbaen & Kupper [7]. Their study thoroughly explores the
implications of the given setup for acceptance sets and coherent risk measures, relating
to earlier work of the authors, providing (Theorem 4.6) a nice characterisation of how
the acceptance sets combine intertemporally. We have nothing to add to the under-
standing of the acceptance sets, because the emphasis here is quite different; we take
the valuations themselves as fundamental (rather than the acceptance sets), and we aim
to discover what consequences of the axiomatic setup can be developed.
In this paper, we present and analyse7 the notion of a dynamic family of concave valua-
tions, extending the dynamic coherent valuation of [3], rather as Frittelli & Gianin [22]
and Fo¨llmer & Schied [20] extend [2] in the single-period context.
The basic object of study here is a family of valuations. To see why such a starting
point may be useful, we quote a simple result which is presumably well known (it
certainly appears in Rogers [36], for example.) The idea is to write down certain natural
axioms that market valuation operators should have, and to derive implications8.
7 We work mainly in the technically simple setting of a finite time set, and a finite probability space Ω;
this allows us to obtain the main ideas without being held up by technical issues.
8Peng [33] develops a set of axioms for non-linear valuations which are similar in some respects. For
example, if we take his axioms (A1)–(A4) and assume positivity and linearity as well, then we obtain the
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Theorem 1 In a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0, P ), suppose that valuation oper-
ators (pitT )0≤t≤T
pist : L
∞(Ft)→ L
∞(Fs) (0 ≤ s ≤ t).
satisfy the following four axioms:
(A1) Each pist is a bounded positive linear operator from L
∞(Ft) to L
∞(Fs);
(A2) If Y ∈ L∞(Ft), Y ≥ 0, then
pi0t(Y ) = 0 ⇐⇒ P (Y > 0) = 0.
(no arbitrage)
(A3) For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ u, Y ∈ L∞(Fu), X ∈ L
∞(Ft),
pisu(XY ) = pist(Xpitu(Y ))
(dynamic consistency)
(A4) If (Yn) ∈ L
∞(Ft), |Yn| ≤ 1, Yn ↑ Y then pist(Yn) ↑ pist(Y ) (continuity)
For simplicity, suppose also that F0 is trivial. Then there exists a strictly positive
process (ζt)t≥0 such that the valuation operators pist can be expressed as
pist(Y ) =
E
[
ζtY
∣∣Fs ]
ζs
(0 ≤ s ≤ t). (3)
The proof of this result takes about a page, and is included in the appendix; nothing
more sophisticated than standard facts about measure theory is required9. However, its
importance is not to be underestimated; it is in some sense a substitute for the Fun-
damental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP). Indeed, the FTAP implies a risk-neutral
valuation principle (3), but its axiomatic starting point is different; in the FTAP we
start from some suitably-formulated axiom of absence of arbitrage, and here we start
from the axioms (A1)–(A4). Which of these two axiomatic starting points one should
wish to assume is of course a matter of taste; in defence of the unconventional approach
taken here, it is worth pointing out10 that if we want to have the valuation principle (3)
for all Y ∈ L∞(Ft), then (A1)–(A4) must hold anyway!
Of the four axioms assumed in Theorem 1, the key one is the dynamic consistency
axiom, (A3), as you will see from the proof; without this, we are able to prove that (3)
holds if s = 0, but this is of course far too limited to be useful. Notice the interpretation
of (A3); we can obtain X units of Y at time u in two ways, either by buying at time s
the contingent claim XY , or by buying at time s the contingent claim which at time t
axiom (A3) of Theorem 1.
9 Note however that the assumption that the valuation operators are defined on the whole of L∞(Ft)
greatly simplifies the argument.
10 It is also worth pointing out that it took years to find the correct formulation for the notion of absence
of arbitrage!
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will deliver X units of the time-t price pitu(Y ) of Y , and (A3) says that these two should
be valued the same at time s.
Now Theorem 1 relates to market valuations, where linearity in the contingent claim
being priced is a reasonable assumption; if we want to buy X and Y , the price will be
the price of X plus the price of Y . However, when it comes to risk measurement, what
the valuation is doing is to tell us how much capital a given firm should set aside to
allow it to accept a named cash balance. Linearity now would not be a property that
we want (we might require a positive premium both to cover a cash balance C and to
cover −C, but we would not require a positive premium to cover the sum of these).
Moreover, the valuations will depend on the particular firm; different firms will have
different valuations, and an interesting question is how these combine.
In the next Section, we shall formulate the analogues of the axioms of Theorem 1
for concave valuations, and deduce some of their consequences. There are substantial
differences; concave valuations have to be defined over cash balances, because without
linearity we cannot build the price of a cash balance from the prices of its component
parts. Nevertheless, the dynamic consistency axiom turns out to be the heart of the
matter. We shall characterise families of valuations which satisfy the given axioms; it
turns out that such families (and their duals) possess simple and appealing recursive
structure.
We shall also study the question of how a firm may decide to divide up a risky
cash balance process between its subsidiaries, each of which is subject to the regulatory
constraints implicit in their individual valuations. We find that there is an optimal way
to do this risk transfer, in terms of a sup-convolution (as in, for example, the study
of Barrieu and El Karoui [4], Klo¨ppel & Schweizer [29].) Moreover, the optimal risk
transfer generates a family of valuations for the firm as a whole, and this family of
valuations satisfies the same axioms as the individual components. We shall also see
that if the firm decides at time 0 how it is going to divide up the cash balance between
its subsidiaries, then at any later time, whatever has happened in the meantime, the
original risk transfer chosen is still optimal. There is therefore a time-consistency in
how the firm should transfer risk among its subsidiaries.
Another question we answer concerns what happens if a firm facing a risky cash
balance process is allowed to take offsetting positions in a financial market. We find
that there is an optimal offsetting position to be taken, which is time consistent, and
the induced valuations for the firm once again satisfy the axioms.
2 Dynamic concave valuations.
Working in a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T , P ), we let BV denote the space
of adapted processes of bounded variation with R-paths11. We think of K ∈ BV as a
cash balance process, with Kt being interpreted as the total amount of cash accumulated
11 This is the terminology of Rogers & Williams [35] for paths that are right continuous with left limits
everywhere.
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by time t. The process K need not of course be increasing. The upper end T of the
time interval considered is a finite constant; there is no real difficulty in letting the time
set be [0,∞), but we choose not to do this here in view of our concentration later on
examples where Ω is finite.
We propose to introduce some natural axioms to be satisfied by a family 12
{piτ : BV → L
∞(Fτ )
∣∣ τ ∈ O}
of valuations. We interpret −piτ (K) as the amount of capital required by law at time τ
to allow a firm to accept the cash balance process K. The requirement could be different
for firms in different countries, or for an investment bank and a hedge fund, for example.
The axioms we require of the family of valuations are the following.
(C) piτ is concave for all τ ;
(L) piτ (IAI[τ,T ]K) = IApiτ (K) for all τ,K, for all A ∈ Fτ ;
(CL) if τ , τ ′ are two stopping times, then
piτ (K) = piτ ′(K) on {τ = τ
′} ;
(M) if Kt ≥ K
′
t for all t, then piτ (K) ≥ piτ (K
′) for all τ ;
(DC) for stopping times τ ≤ σ,
piτ (K) = piτ (KI[τ,σ) + piσ(K)I[σ,T ]);
(TI) if for some a ∈ L∞(Fτ ) we have Kt = K
′
t + a for all t ≥ τ , then piτ (K) =
a+ piτ (K
′);
(Z) piτ (0) = 0 ∀τ ∈ O.
Remarks. Axiom (C) is a natural property for capital adequacy requirements for risky
cash balances; see [2], for example.
Axiom (L) (for local) says two things. Firstly, if you have reached time τ , then all
that matters for valuation is how much cash has currently been accumulated, and what
is to come; the exact timing of the earlier payments does not influence the valuation13.
Secondly, Axiom (L) expresses the following natural fact: at time τ , if event A has not
happened then the cash balance IAI[0, τ)K is clearly worthless, and if the event has
12 As usual, O denotes the optional σ-field on [0, T ]×Ω, and by extension the statement τ ∈ O for a random
time τ means that I[τ,T ] is an optional process, equivalently, that τ is a stopping time - see, for example, [35]
for more background on the general theory of processes.
13 Note that Axiom (L) does not say that you value the increments of the cash balance K after τ the same
as the whole of the original cash balance K! The axiom says that you value K the same as the cash balance
I[τ,T ]K, which pays nothing up til time τ , then a lump sum of Kτ .
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happened, then the cash balance IAI[0, τ)K will be worth the same as K. It is easily
seen that (L) implies the following useful consequences:
piτ (K) = piτ (I[τ,T ]K),
piτ (IAK) = IApiτ (K)
= piτ (IAI[τ,T ]K)
= IApiτ (IAK)
for any τ ∈ O, A ∈ Fτ , and cash balance K. Another useful consequence of (L) is the
property
(Z) piτ (0) = 0 ∀τ ∈ O,
which we see by taking A = ∅.
Axiom (CL) (for consistent localisation) says that the localisations of piτ and piτ ′
agree where τ = τ ′, again a natural condition.
Axiom (M) (for monotonicity) says that a larger capital reserve is required to short
a larger cash balance, but it says more than just this. In particular, if Kt ≥ K
′
t for
all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , with KT = K
′
T , then the two cash balances K and K
′ both deliver
exactly the same in total, but K is considered less risky than K ′ because it delivers the
cash sooner. An earlier version of this work used an axiom which expressed indifference
between cash balances that delivered the same total amount of cash; though this axiom
was entirely workable, the effect of it was that the valuations were essentially defined
on cash balances which were all delivered at time T , and the valuations themselves
served only to ‘interpolate’ prices in some sense. The interpretation of (M) is not
that earlier payments are preferred to later payments because of the interest that will
accrue; indeed, we think of all payments as being discounted back to time-0 values (or
equivalently that the interest rate is zero). Even under these assumptions, according to
(M) earlier payments are better than later ones - as in reality they are! This embodies
the essence of cashflow problems, where a firm may be in difficulties not because it does
not have sufficient money owed to it, but because that money has not yet come in.
Axiom (DC) (for dynamic consistency) has a simple and natural interpretation. It
says that we must set aside as much for the cash balance K, as for the cash balance
which gives us K up to time σ, and at time σ requires us to hand in the accumulated
cash balance Kσ in return for the amount of cash that we would allow us to accept the
entire cash balance K. This latter cash balance would clearly allow us to accept the
original cash balance K. It is worth remarking that in some other studies the expression
of the notion of dynamic consistency appears much simpler: see, for example, [33], [15],
where it is possible to express dynamic consistency as piτ = piτpiσ for any stopping times
τ ≤ σ. However, do note that these studies are only concerned with valuing terminal
cash balances; if we restrict the condition (DC) to cash balance processes which are non-
zero only at time T , then we get this same simple form. When valuing only terminal
cash balances, the intermediate valuations are simply numbers which do not correspond
to any cash value. By contrast, in the setting we are using, the intermediate valuations
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must be denominated in cash (or some other asset), because we are going to have to
consider exchanging a future cash balance process for cash today. This is why the axiom
(DC) looks a little more involved14. [7] use exactly the same criterion.
The next axiom (TI) (for translation invariance) is again entirely natural if we think
(as we do) that valuations should have a monetary interpretation. We hope later to
see what can be done if (TI) is abandoned, as this leads us back closer to the idea of
recursive utility ([18], [16], [39]); however, the first thing that will need to be done is to
revise the notion of dynamic consistency.
Finally, axiom (Z) (for zero level) is again a natural consequence of the notion that
piτ (K) is the capital reserve required to allow the firm to accept cash balance process
K.
In the next Section, we shall explore the consequences of these axioms only in the
simplest possible setting, where Ω is finite. This means in particular that we can take
the time set to be finite, and the entire filtered probability space to be represented by
a tree. This (restrictive) assumption allows us to ignore all technicalities, and quickly
uncover essential structure implied by the axioms. We remark only that in any real-
world application we would be forced to use a numerical approach, in which case we
would have to be working with a finite sample-space.
3 Valuations on finite trees.
Henceforth, we work with a finite sample space Ω, and a finite time set {0, 1, . . . , T}.
The σ-field F on Ω is of course the σ-field of all subsets, and the filtration is represented
by a tree15 with vertex set T . The root of the tree will be denoted by 0, and from
any vertex y ∈ T there is a unique path to 0; we shall say that y is a descendant of x
(written x  y) if x lies on the path from y to 0. If x ∈ T , we shall write x− 1 for the
immediate ancestor of x, x + 1 for the set of immediate descendants of x, and x+ for
the set of all descendants of x, including x itself. Note that Ω can be identified with the
set of endpoints of T . For any x ∈ T we shall denote by t(x) the time of x, which is the
depth of x in the tree. Thus t(0) = 0; t(y) = t(x) + 1 for any y ∈ x+ 1; and t(x) = T
for any terminal node x. Notice also that a stopping time τ can be identified with a
subset16 JτK of T with the property that for any terminal node ω of the tree the unique
path from ω to 0 intersects JτK in exactly one place.
In this setting, a cash balance is simply a map K : T → R. We interpret Kx as the
cumulative amount of the cash balance at vertex x in the tree. We shall also suppose
throughout that interest rates are zero, or equivalently that cash balances have all been
discounted back to time-0 values; this assumption is insubstantial, and leaves us clear
to focus on what is important here.
In view of axiom (C), the valuations piτ are just concave functions defined on some
14 This also motivates the common use of the clumsier term ‘monetary utility function’ instead of ‘valuation’.
15 The tree does not of course have to be binomial, or regular.
16 The graph of τ - see [35].
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finite-dimensional Euclidean space, and so can be studied through their convex dual
functions
p˜iτ (λ) ≡ sup
K
{piτ (K)− λ ·K}.
For simplicity of exposition, we shall make the assumption
ASSUMPTION A: For every τ , the valuation piτ is concave, strictly increasing, and
C2 in the relative interior of its domain of finiteness.
By duality, the original functions piτ can be expressed as
piτ (K) = inf
λ
{λ ·K + p˜iτ (λ)}; (4)
compare with the equation (2) above, as in Fo¨llmer & Schied [20], Frittelli & Gianin
[22]. That equation is at one level simply the general statement (4) of duality, but with
a bit more; in (2) the infimum is taken over a family of probability measures, and in
(4) the infimum is unrestricted. We shall later see that the axioms used here do in fact
imply that λ must be a probability on x+ for each x ∈ JτK.
3.1 Decomposition.
The dynamic consistency axiom (DC) and localisation axioms (L), (CL) allow us to
decompose the valuations in a simple way. To see this, notice firstly that the family
(piτ ) of valuations is determined once the smaller family {pix : x ∈ T } is known, where
for x ∈ T the operator pix is defined to be
pix = piτx , (5)
where τx is the stopping time
τx(ω) = t(x) if x ≺ ω; (6)
= T otherwise.
Here, of course, we are identifying Ω with the set of terminal nodes of T . Once we know
the operators {pix : x ∈ T }, Axioms (L) and (CL) allow us to put together any of the
piτ .
However, the pix can themselves be assembled from the family {pix,x+1 : x ∈ T }
of one-step valuations, defined in the following way. If x is a terminal node, then the
argument of pix,x+1 is a cash balance k defined at x, and pix,x+1(k) = pix(k). For all
other x, given a cash balance k defined on x∪ x+1, we extend this to a cash balance k¯
defined on all of T by
k¯z = kx if z = x;
= ky if y  z for some y ∈ x+ 1;
= 0 otherwise.
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We may then define
pix,x+1(k) = piτx(k¯). (7)
Of course, the point of this decomposition is really the converse: we wish to build the
(complicated) family (piτ )τ∈O from the simpler family (pix,x+1)x∈T of one-step valuations.
It is clear that if we derive (pix,x+1)x∈T from a family (piτ )τ∈O satisfying the axioms given
in Section 2, then the family of one-step valuations must have the following properties:
(c) pix,x+1 is concave;
(m) if kz ≥ k
′
z for all z ∈ x ∪ x+ 1 then pix,x+1(k) ≥ pix,x+1(k
′);
(ti) if kz = k
′
z + a for all z ∈ x ∪ x+ 1, then pix,x+1(k) = pix,x+1(k
′) + a;
(z) pix,x+1(0) = 0.
What we now argue is that given a family (pix,x+1)x∈T of one-step valuations satisfying
(c), (m), (ti), (z) we can build a family (piτ )τ∈O of valuations satisfying the axioms of
Section 2.
The essence of the construction is to get the (pix)x∈T , for then if we have a stopping
time τ we define
piτ (K) = piz(K) at z ∈ JτK.
To get the (pix)x∈T , we proceed by backward induction, assuming that we have con-
structed pix for all x such that t(x) ≥ n. The induction starts, because if x is a terminal
node we have pix(k) = pix,x+1(k), and if t(x) = n− 1 we may define
pix(K) = pix,x+1(k),
where k is the cash balance defined by
kz = Kx if z = x;
= piz(K) if z ∈ x+ 1.
There is no problem with this, as the definition of pix requires only the one-step op-
erator pix,x+1 and the operators (piz)z∈x+1 which are already known (by the inductive
hypothesis).
If we vary the notation for pix,x+1(k) ≡ pix,x+1(kx, kx+1) so as to make the dependence
on the cash balances at node x and nodes x+1 explicit, then the recursive construction
of the pix takes the clean form
pix(K) = pix,x+1(Kx, pix+1(K)). (8)
Notice the formal similarity to the notion of recursive utility - see Epstein & Zin [18],
Duffie & Epstein [16], Skiadas [39]. This similarity is only formal; the theory of recursive
utility deals with preferences over running consumption processes, a notion that does not
10
feature in our present discussion. This is an interesting possible variant of the axiomatic
approach which we hope to return to at a later date.
It remains to see that the operators (piτ )τ∈O defined by (8) satisfy the axioms given
in Section 2.
Property (C) follows from the concavity property (c) by backward induction. Prop-
erties (L) and (CL) are immediate from the construction. Property (M) follows from
(m), again by backward induction. Property (DC) requires a little more thought (and
use of the property (ti)), but again follows from the construction. Finally, property (TI)
is a consequence of (ti).
3.2 Duality.
We have just seen that the axioms permit us to decompose the valuations into simpler
pieces, but what is the corresponding result for the dual valuations p˜ix? What are the
characteristic properties?
To understand the structure of the dual, firstly note that the dual valuation
p˜ix(λ) ≡ sup
K
{pix(K)− λ ·K} (9)
is not always going to be finite. Indeed, because of (L) and (CL), p˜ix(λ) will be infinite
if λy 6= 0 for some y 6∈ x+. Moreover, because of (M) the dual will be infinite if λy < 0
for some y. Finally, by considering cash balances K that are constant on x+ and using
axiom (TI), we see that for finiteness of p˜ix(λ) it is necessary that λ be a probability on
x+:
∑
y∈x+ λy = 1.
One further property can be deduced: infλ p˜ix(λ) = pix(0) = 0, using the duality
relation and (Z). Thus the dual valuations (p˜ix)x∈T must satisfy the conditions
(D1) p˜ix is convex;
(D2) p˜ix(λ) is only finite if λ is a probability on x+;
(D3) infλ p˜ix(λ) = 0.
The recursion for the dual valuations will follow from the recursive form (8) of the
primal valuations. To make this explicit, we need to define the convex duals p˜ix,x+1 of
the one-step valuations by the usual definition
p˜ix,x+1(θ, ψ) = sup
k
{ pix,x+1(kx, kx+1)− θkx − ψ · kx+1}.
The analogues of (D1)-(D3) for the dual one-step valuations will be
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(d1) p˜ix,x+1 is convex;
(d2) p˜ix,x+1(λ) is only finite if λ is a probability on x ∪ x+ 1;
(d3) infλ p˜ix,x+1(λ) = 0.
It is easy to see that conditions (c), (m) and (ti) on the one-step valuations are equivalent
to conditions (d1)-(d3) on their duals.
What then is the dual analogue of the primal recursion (8)? The answer is provided
by the following result.
Theorem 2 For all x ∈ T and λ a probability on x+, we have
p˜ix(λ) = p˜ix,x+1(λx, λ¯x+1) +
∑
z∈x+1
λ¯zp˜iz
(
λz
λ¯z
)
(10)
where λz denotes the restriction of λ to the set {y : y  z}, and λ¯z ≡
∑
yz λy.
Remarks: (i) Observe that the function
(λ¯z, λz) 7→ λ¯zp˜iz
(
λz
λ¯z
)
= sup{λ¯zpiz(K)− λz ·K}
is convex.
(ii) Theorem 4.19 of [7] has a similar flavour to Theorem 2.
Proof. Using (8) and (4), we have
pix(K) = inf
λ
{p˜ix(λ) + λ ·K}
= pix(Kx, pix+1(K))
= inf
λ,α
{ p˜ix,x+1(λx, α) + λxKx + α · pix+1(K) }
= inf
λ,α,ψ
{ p˜ix,x+1(λx, α) + λxKx + α · (p˜ix+1(ψ) + ψ ·K[x+1,T ]) }
= inf
λ,α,ψ
[
p˜ix,x+1(λx, α) + λxKx +
∑
z∈x+1
αz{p˜iz(ψ) + ψz ·K[z,T ]}
]
= inf
λ,α
[
p˜ix,x+1(λx, α) + λxKx +
∑
z∈x+1
λz ·K[z,T ] +
∑
z∈x+1
αzp˜iz(λz/αz)
]
.
At the last step, we have made the change of variable λz ≡ αzψz for z ∈ x + 1.
However, the only way that the terms inside the final infimum can be finite is if the
arguments of the dual valuations p˜ix,x+1 and p˜iz are probabilities; and this only happens
if αz = λ¯z for all z ∈ x+ 1. The conclusion is that
pix(K) = inf
λ
[
p˜ix,x+1(λx, λ¯x+1) +
∑
z∈x+1
λ¯zp˜iz
(
λz
λ¯z
)
+ λ ·K
]
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and the result is proved. 
Notice that if we are given operators (p˜ix,x+1)x∈T satisfying (d1)-(d3), together with
the condition that p˜ix,x+1 ≡ 0 for any terminal node x, then the corresponding one-step
valuations (pix,x+1)x∈T satisfy (c), (m), (ti), and pix,x+1(k) = kx for any terminal node
x. By dualising (10) we quickly arrive at (8). Thus we may just as well construct a
family of valuations piτ satisfying the axioms by starting from a family (p˜ix,x+1)x∈T of
dual one-step valuations satisfying (d1)-(d3).
4 Examples
Let us consider some examples which can be analysed fairly completely in the tree
setting.
Example 1: relative entropy. Suppose given some strictly positive probability dis-
tribution (py)y∈T on T . For any x ∈ T we define the dual valuation p˜ix evaluated at
some probability λ on x+ to be
p˜ix(λ) =
1
γ
∑
yx
λy log(λy p¯x/py) ≡ h(λx | px/p¯x ), (11)
where γ > 0 is some positive parameter, and as before p¯x =
∑
yx py. For other
arguments, p˜ix is infinite. It is well known that the function p˜ix is convex, and its
concave dual function is easily calculated to be
pix(K) = −
1
γ
log
[∑
yx
py
p¯x
e−γKy
]
, (12)
equivalently,
e−γpix(K) =
∑
yx
py
p¯x
e−γKy . (13)
It is now easy to check the axioms (C), (M), (DC), (TI) of a family of valuation operators,
and the axioms (L) and (CL) will hold by construction when we assemble the (pix).
Remark. From (13) we might conjecture that similar examples could be constructed
by the recipe
U(pix(K)) =
∑
yx
py
p¯x
U(Ky) (14)
for some other utility U . However, it is not clear that axioms (TI) and (C) will be
satisfied in general, and indeed the relative entropy example is the only example17.
To see why this is, if (TI) and (14) hold, then for any a ∈ R we shall have (assuming
with no loss of generality that x = 0, and that py > 0 ∀y to avoid triviality)
U(a+ pi0(K)) = U(pi0(a+K)) =
∑
y
py U(a+Ky). (15)
17 See also Proposition 2.8 of [25] for a similar result.
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Suppose we choose some non-constant K for which pi0(K) = 0, and perturb Ky to
Ky + tvy; differentiating (15) with respect to t at t = 0 yields
U ′(a)
∑
y
vy
∂pi0(K)
∂Ky
=
∑
y
pyvyU
′(a+Ky)
implying that ∑
y
vy
∂pi0(K)
∂Ky
=
∑
y
pyvy
U ′(a+Ky)
U ′(a)
does not depend on a. Now select some y for which Ky = δ > 0, and make vy = 1,
vz = 0 for z 6= y. We conclude that U
′(a+δ)/U ′(a) does not depend on a. Monotonicity
of U ′ and the fact that δ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily imply that U ′ is exponential.
Example 2. This example is really a family of examples, built from the simple obser-
vation that if we have some collection (piθx,x+1)x∈T ,θ∈Θ of one-step valuation operators,
such that for each θ the family (piθx,x+1)x∈T satisfies the axioms (c), (m) and (ti), then
the one-step valuation operators defined by
pix(k) ≡ inf
θ
piθx,x+1(k) (16)
again satisfy (c), (m) and (ti).
One simple example of this form could be constructed as follows. Suppose that for
each x ∈ T we have some probability distribution α(x) on the immediate descendents
x+ 1, and now we define
pix,x+1(k) = min{kx,
∑
y∈x+1
α(x)yky}.
The recursion (8) is now just the Bellman equation of dynamic programming, and the
value of pix(K) is the ‘worst stopping’ value of the Markov decision process, where α(x)
gives the distribution of moves down to x + 1 from x if it is decided not to stop at x.
It is easy to extend this example to the situation where a finite collection of possible
distributions αi(x) is considered at each vertex x, and the valuation operator gives the
‘worst worst stopping’ value!
Several of the examples of [7] are of this form, and we make no further remark on
them. However, one feature that is noteworthy is the following. If we make the one-step
valuation operators as infima of some sequence of linear functionals,
pix,x+1(k) = min
j
αj · k
then the valuations constructed are coherent, and the dual one-step valuation operators
p˜ix are
p˜ix,x+1(λ) = 0 if λ ∈ co({α
j})
= ∞ otherwise,
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where co(A) denotes the convex hull of the set A. Looking at the recursive form (10) of
the dual valuation operators, we see that these too take only the values 0 and ∞. The
set of λ for which p˜i0(λ) is finite is a mutiplicatively stable set.
Example 3. Families of one-step valuations pix,x+1 can be constructed via the notion
of a utility-indifference price for a single-period problem. In more detail, given some
probability distribution py over x ∪ x + 1, we define pix,x+1(k) to be that value b such
that
U(x0) =
∑
y∈x∪x+1
pyU(x0 + ky − b) (17)
where U is some strictly increasing utility function, and x0 is some reference wealth
level. The properties (m) and (ti) are immediate, and (c) is a simple deduction.
It is unfortunately the case that there are few examples where the utility-indifference
price for a single-period problem can be computed in closed form, and the dual valuation
is similarly elusive. Some progress can be made however. Dropping the subscripts, the
calculation of the dual valuation requires us to find
p˜i(λ) = sup
k
{pi(k) − λ · k}
and the optimisation here can be considered as the optimisation
sup
b,k
b− λ · k (18)
subject to U(x0) =
∑
pyU(x0 + ky − b). (19)
The Lagrangian form of the problem
sup
b,k
[
b− λ · k + θ(
∑
pyU(x0 + ky − b)− U(x0))
]
leads to the first-order conditions
1 = θ
∑
pyU
′(x0 + ky − b),
λy = θpyU
′(x0 + ky − b),
so (with I ≡ (U ′)−1) we get
x0 + ky − b = I
( λy
θpy
)
,
from which we see that θ is determined via
∑
pyU
(
I
( λy
θpy
))
= U(x0).
The final expression
p˜i(λ) = x0 −
∑
λyI
(
λy
θpy
)
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simplifies in the case of CRRA U(x) = x1−R/(1−R) to
p˜i(λ) = x0 − x
R
0
(∑
p1/Ry λ
1−1/R
y
)R/(R−1)
.
Remarks. This example constructs a family of valuations from one-step valuations
which can be interpreted as utility-indifference prices. Utility-indifference pricing is a
popular method for pricing in incomplete markets (at least for the pricing of a European-
style contingent claims18); how does it relate to what we are doing here? Suppose we take
a cash-balance process which is zero at all non-terminal nodes. We can for each x ∈ T
compute the utility-indifference price starting from node x, but is this recipe consistent
with the axioms we have set down here? Of course, the utility-indifference prices can
only be computed (at least in the first place) for terminal contingent claims; we do not
know to start with how we might price more complicated cash balances from utility
indifference. Nevertheless, we can already say that in general such utility-indifference
prices do not satisfy the axioms we are considering here.
To see why, consider a two-period trinomial tree, with each of the nine terminal
nodes having equal probability. We assume that the agent has a CRRA utility, and
will receive a baseline payment of 2 at each terminal node,. He now tries to value
a contingent claim that pays yω at ω. It is an easy matter to calculate the utility-
indifference price at the root node, and at each of the time-1 nodes. Now if these
valuations are to satisfy (DC), if we consider different y which all have the same time-1
utility-indifference prices, then they must have the same time-0 utility-indifference price;
numerical examples demonstrate that they do not, and so utility-indifference pricing does
not satisfy the axioms we have given for valuations.
5 Spreading and evolution of risk.
Let us consider the situation of a firm which consists of J subsidiaries, possibly in
different countries, or subject to different regulatory controls. We let the valuations
(pijτ )τ∈O determine the regulatory requirements of subsidiary j, j = 1, . . . , J . If (at τ)
subsidiary i wishes to accept the cash balance process K, then regulation requires that
subsidiary to reserve −piiτ (K).
Remark. This implicitly supposes that the subsidiary faces a zero cash balance process,
and that it will only incur regulatory capital requirements if it changes this. This
contrasts with [4], [28], where it is supposed that the subsidiary has already entered
into some commitments, which have involved the acceptance of cash balance K∗, say;
their risk-sharing results then depend on the K∗ for each subsidiary. In our treatment,
if the subsidiary is already committed to K∗, then we introduce the valuations pi∗τ (K) ≡
piτ (K+K
∗)−piτ (K
∗) (it can be checked that these are valuations, satisfying the axioms
(C), (L), (CL), (M), (DC), (TI), (Z)), and proceed with these. This is notationally
18 The study [8] tackles utility-indifference pricing in the context of risk measurement.
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simpler; the results do indeed depend on the subsidiaries’ prior commitments, though
this dependence does not appear explicitly. The interested reader is invited to make
appropriate notational changes to express the dependence on K∗ explicitly if desired.
To reduce its risk, subsidiary i could approach another subsidiary j and get them to
take from i the cash-balance process Kj in return for the regulatory capital −pijτ (Kj).
Subsidiary i is free to enter into such agreements with all the other subsidiaries, and will
do so in such a way as to minimise the regulatory capital required. Taking into account
the possibilities of risk transfer, subsidiary i will need to reserve −Πiτ (K) instead of
piiτ (K), where
Πiτ (K) = sup{pi
i
τ (K −
∑
j 6=i
Kj +
∑
j 6=i
pijτ (K
j)I[τ,T ])}
= sup{piiτ (K −
∑
j 6=i
Kj) +
∑
j 6=i
pijτ (K
j)}
= sup{
∑
j
pijτ (K
j) :
∑
j
Kj = K}. (20)
Notice that this is independent of the choice of subsidiary, so we write simply Πτ for
Πiτ . Moreover, we may have that Πτ (0) > 0, so we define
0Πτ (K) = Πτ (K)−Πτ (0), (21)
so as to have the property (Z) for the operators 0Πτ . The quantity Πx(0) can be
interpreted as the value of risk-sharing at vertex x. We call the family ( 0Πτ )τ∈O of
valuations the risk-sharing valuations, though it is not clear as yet that we may refer
to them as such, since we do not know that they satisfy the axioms for a family of
valuations. That is the task of the following result.
Theorem 3 The risk-sharing valuations ( 0Πτ )τ∈O satisfy the axioms (C), (L), (CL),
(M), (DC), and (TI) of the component valuations (pijτ )τ∈O, j = 1, . . . , J .
Proof. Properties (C), (L), (CL), (M), and (TI) are straightforward to verify; only the
property (DC) is not immediately obvious. To establish this, we have on the one hand
Πx(K) = sup{
∑
j
pijx(K
j) :
∑
j
Kj = K}
= sup{
∑
j
pijx(K
jI[x,τ) + pi
j
τ (K
j)I[τ,T ]) :
∑
j
Kj = K}
= sup{
∑
j
pijx(K
jI[x,τ) + ajI[τ,T ]) :
∑
j
KjI[x,τ) = KI[x,τ),
∑
j
aj ≤ Πτ (K)} (22)
17
and on the other hand we have
Πx(K[x,τ) +
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ]) = sup{
∑
j
pijx(K
j) :
∑
j
Kj = K[x,τ) +
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ]}
= sup{
∑
j
pijx(K
jI[x,τ) + pi
j
τ (K
j)I[τ,T ]) :
∑
j
Kj = K[x,τ) +
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ]}
= sup{
∑
j
pijx(K
jI[x,τ) + ajI[τ,T ]) :
∑
j
KjI[x,τ) = KI[x,τ),
∑
j
aj ≤ Πτ (
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ])} (23)
But Πτ (
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ]) = Πτ (0) +
0Πτ (K) = Πτ (K) and comparing (22) and (23) we
see that Πx(K) = Πx(K[x,τ) +
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ]), equivalently,
0Πx(K) =
0Πx(K[x,τ) +
0Πτ (K)I[τ,T ]), as required.
There is a simple interpretation of risk-sharing in terms of the duals. Indeed, from (20)
we have that
Π˜x(λ) = sup
(Kj)
{
∑
j
pijx(K
j)− λ ·
∑
j
Kj}
=
∑
j
p˜ijx(λ),
so the effect of risk-sharing is simply to add the dual valuations.
5.1 Optimal risk transfer in the relative entropy example.
If each of the J subsidiaries has valuations of the relative entropy form (recall (12)):
e−γjpi
j
x(K) =
∑
yx
pjy
p¯jx
e−γjKy , (24)
how do they combine under risk sharing? For the moment, let us fix a particular x ∈ T
and consider how things work from that node. We shall write p˜jy ≡ p
j
y/p¯
j
x for brevity,
and shall define
Γ ≡
(∑
j
γ−1j
)−1
. (25)
The dual valuations are given by (see (11) )
p˜ijx(λ) =
1
γj
∑
yx
λy log(λy/p˜
j
y),
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so the risk-sharing result gives us
Π˜x(λ) =
∑
j
p˜ijx(λ)
=
∑
j
1
γj
∑
yx
λy log(λy/p˜
j
y)
=
1
Γ
{∑
yx
λy log λy −
∑
j
Γ
γj
∑
yx
λy log p˜
j
y
}
=
1
Γ
∑
yx
λy log(λy/Py) +
1
Γ
logA,
where we define the probability P on x+ and the constant A by
Py ≡ A
∏
i
(p˜iy)
Γ/γi ≡
∏
i(p˜
i
y)
Γ/γi∑
zx
∏
i(p˜
i
z)
Γ/γi
. (26)
A ≡
(∑
zx
∏
i
(p˜iz)
Γ/γi
)−1
(27)
From this we see that
Πx(0) =
1
Γ
logA
= −
1
Γ
log
{∑
yx
∏
i
(p˜iy)
Γ/γi
}
= −
1
Γ
log
{∑
yx
exp(
∑
j
Γ
γj
log(p˜jy))
}
≥ 0,
by Jensen’s inequality, with equality if and only if all the agents have the same pjy. Thus
we see that the aggregated dual valuations 0˜Πx have the same relative-entropy form as
the individual dual valuations, with explicit expressions (25) for the combined coefficient
of absolute risk aversion Γ and (26) for the combined distribution of the probability down
the tree.
How does the risk sharing work out in this example? The maximisation (20) of∑
j pi
j
x(Kj) can be computed, leading to the conclusion that
Kjy =
Γ
γj
Ky +
{
1
γj
log p˜jy −
Γ
γj
(∑
i
1
γi
log p˜iy
) }
. (28)
=
Γ
γj
Ky +
1
γj
log(p˜jy/Py) +
Γ
γj
Πx(0) (29)
This provides a nice interpretation of the way that the cash balance K gets shared.
At each node y, the cash balance Ky at the node gets split proportionally between the
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subsidiaries (‘linear risk sharing’ as in [5]), and there are a further two terms, one relating
to the ratio of subsidiary j’s probability of the node y and the aggregated probability
Py, and the other proportional to Πx(0).
5.2 Dynamic stability of the risk-sharing solution.
When computing the value Π0(0) of risk-sharing at time 0, the subsidiaries find them-
selves solving the optimisation problem
sup{
∑
j
pij0(K
j) :
∑
j
Kj = 0}.
Casting the problem in Lagrangian form
sup{
∑
j
[pij0(K
j)− p ·Kj ]},
it is easy to see that at an optimal solution we shall have that all subsidiaries’ marginal
valuations of cash balances will coincide:
∇pij0(K
j) = p. (30)
Suppose that at time 0 they adopt the optimal cash balance processes Kj obtained in
this way; as time passes, will they still be satisfied with the Kj they first agreed to? It
would be disturbing if we reached some vertex x in the tree where the subsidiaries would
wish to renegotiate the deals that they had committed to at time 0. However, it turns
out that this does not happen: and it is the condition (DC) and the chain rule which
guarantees this.
If x is some vertex in the tree, and we let τ = τx (recall (6)), then using (DC) we
have
pij0(K) = pi
j
0(KI[0,τ) + pi
j
τ (K)I[τ,T ])
and differentiating both sides with respect to Ky, where y  x, gives us (by the chain
rule)
py =
∂pij0
∂Ky
(Kj) =
∂pij0
∂Kx
(KjI[0,τ) + pi
j
τ (K
j)I[τ,T ])
∂pijx
∂Ky
(Kj).
Accordingly, in view of (30), we have for each j that there exists a constant bj such that
for all y  x
∂pijx
∂Ky
(Kj) = bjpy,
and so at vertex x the remaining allocations (cash balances) KjI[x,T ] still constitute a
competitive equilibrium; there are no mutually beneficial trades available to the agents
at vertex x.
Remarks. We could have discussed this dynamic stability in terms of competitive
equilibria. Indeed, if we were to write U j(K) in place of pij0(K), then the concave
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increasing functions U j can serve as the utilities of different agents, defined over bundles
of goods, where cash balances at different vertices are interpreted as different goods. We
are now in the realm of finding an equilibrium allocation, which is a standard part of
microeconomic theory; see, for example, [30]. However, although the mathematics is
exactly that of finding an equilibrium in a pure exchange economy, such an analogy is
economically impure; here, we have been interpreting the pijx as some sort of price, not as
a utility. We allow (for example) the values pijx(K) into the arguments of the functions
pij0. It seems to us that the link is tenuous, and we desist from pushing the analogy too
far.
5.3 Spreading risk by access to a market.
Suppose a firm with valuations (pix)x∈T is allowed access to a market; how will it act, and
how does its valuation of cash balances change? The discussion is similar to that of risk
sharing among subsidiaries, but sufficiently different to require a separate treatment19.
We represent access to the market in the following way. At each stopping time τ , the
firm may change a given cash balance process K to K +K ′ for any K ′ ∈ Gτ , where Gτ
denotes the gains-from-trade cash balance processes which could be achieved by trading
in the market starting with zero wealth at time τ . Concerning the Gτ we shall assume
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that
(c-m) each Gτ is convex;
(l-m) for each x ∈ JτK,
Gτx = {KI[x,T ] : K ∈ Gτ};
(dc-m) for each τ ≤ σ ∈ O if Kσ denotes21 the cash balance process K stopped at σ,
we have
Gτ = {K
σ +K ′ : K ∈ Gτ ,K
′ ∈ Gσ}
Now the cash balance valuation given access to this market will be via
Πx(K) ≡ sup{pix(K +K
′) : K ′ ∈ Gx}. (31)
Once again, there is no guarantee that Πx(0) = 0, but if we define
0Πx(K) ≡ Πx(K)−Πx(0), (32)
then the operators ( 0Πx)x∈T do have this property (Z). As in the case of risk-sharing,
the quantity Πx(0) is the value to the agent of being granted access to the market at
vertex x.
19 The effect of access to a market in the context of dynamic valuation of terminal contingent claims is
addressed also in [29].
20 Recall the definition (6) of τx.
21 Formally, Kσz = Ky if z  y ∈ JσK; = Kz otherwise.
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Theorem 4 The valuations ( 0Πτ )τ∈O satisfy the axioms (C), (L), (CL), (M), (DC),
and (TI).
Proof. As before, all of the properties except for (DC) are obvious. To prove (DC),
we use properties (DC) for the pix and (dc-m) to develop
Πx(K) = sup{pix(K +K
′) : K ′ ∈ Gx}
= sup{pix((K +K
′)I[x,σ) + piσ(K +K
′)I[σ,T ]) : K
′ ∈ Gx}
= sup{pix((K +K
′)I[x,σ) + {Πσ(K) +K
′
σ}I[σ,T ]) : K
′ ∈ Gx}. (33)
On the other hand,
Πx(KI[x,σ) +
0Πσ(K)I[σ,T ]) = sup{pix(KI[x,σ) +
0Πσ(K)I[σ,T ] +K
′) : K ′ ∈ Gx}
= sup{pix((K +K
′)I[x,σ) +
0Πσ(K)I[σ,T ] +K
′I[σ,T ]) : K
′ ∈ Gx}
= sup{pix( (K +K
′)I[x,σ) +
0Πσ(K)I[σ,T ] +
+piσ(K
′I[σ,T ])I[σ,T ] ) : K
′ ∈ Gx}
= sup{pix( (K +K
′)I[x,σ) +
0Πσ(K)I[σ,T ] +
+(Πσ(0) +K
′
σ)I[σ,T ] ) : K
′ ∈ Gx} (34)
since when we maximise piσ(K
′I[σ,T ]) over K
′ we get Πσ(0) +K
′
σ. Comparing (33) and
(34) establishes property (DC) for the operators ( 0Πτ )τ∈T .
6 Conclusions.
This paper has approached the problem of convex risk measurement in a dynamic setting
from a slightly unconventional starting point; instead of trying to work with acceptance
sets, we begin with valuations satisfying certain axioms which seem to us to be natural.
Our notion of preference does not reduce to a simple valuation of all the proceeds of
the cashflow collected at the end, but genuinely accounts for the (obvious) fact that you
would prefer to have $1M today rather than the value of $1M invested at riskless rate
in five years from now.
In the simplest situation, where the sample-space is finite, we show how a family of
pricing operators obeying our axioms can be decomposed into (and reconstructed from)
a family of one-period pricing operators which are much easier to grasp. There is a
corresponding decomposition of the dual pricing functions.
Allowing a firm to spread risk among a number of subsidiaries leads to risk-sharing
solutions; the firm derives benefit from risk sharing, and, remarkably, the risk-sharing
valuations which arise satisfy exactly the same set of axioms satisfied by the initial
valuations.
We have seen also that the risk sharing that arises will be stable over time; if at time
0 the firm chooses how to spread risk among its subsidiaries, then no matter how the
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world evolves, at all later times it will continue to be satisfied with the cash balances
that it originally selected.
We study also what happens when a firm is allowed access to a financial market.
Assuming some natural properties of the market, the conclusions are similar to the risk-
sharing problem; the firm derives a fixed benefit from being allowed access to the market,
but beyond that it values cash balance processes according to modified valuations which
satisfy the same axioms.
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A Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us consider the filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0, P ).
For any T > 0, the map A 7→ pi0T (IA) defines a non-negative measure on the σ-field FT ,
from the linearity, positivity and continuity properties of our pricing operator.
This measure is moreover absolutely continuous with respect to P in view of (A2).
Hence by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, for any T > 0, there exists a non-negative
FT -measurable random variable ζT such that
pi0T (Y ) = E[ζTY ]
for all Y ∈ L∞(FT ).
Moreover, (A2) implies that P [ζT > 0] = 1.
We finally use the consistency condition (A3) as follows. Let Y ∈ L∞(FT ), then by
definition, pitT (Y ) ∈ L
∞(Ft). For any X ∈ L
∞(Ft),
pi0t(XpitT (Y )) = E[XζtpitT (Y )]
= pi0T (XY )
= E[XY ζT ].
Since X ∈ L∞(Ft) is arbitrary, we deduce that
pitT (Y ) =
1
ζt
Et[ζTY ]
which shows that the pricing operators pist are actually given by the risk-neutral pricing
recipe (3) described in Theorem 1, with the state-price density process ζ.
The state-price density process is often thought of as the product of the discount factor
exp
(
−
∫ t
0 rsds
)
and the change-of-measure martingale.
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